Watch the video, transcript and sources
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-XvzF3ltaGE
- A website could drive an extension-owned picker
+ The patched picker verifies authorization at launchuBlock Origin's element picker is meant to help you remove an annoying page element. A disclosed flaw let a hostile website use that convenient interface to save trusted filters. Those filters could affect a different site. The vulnerability is fixed, and the useful first step is checking the extension version actually installed in your browser.
The maintainer advisory lists 1.75.2 and lower as affected and 1.75.4 as patched. GitHub and Mozilla currently list 1.76.4 as the stable release. Use normal browser extension controls to update to the current stable version. The availability of an update says nothing about whether a particular installation has received it.
The interface carried more authority than it appeared to
Smitty van Bodegom published his report on November 15. Raymond Hill's advisory says the issue was reported privately on November 1. The disclosed path concerns Firefox's MV2 extension architecture, a relevant filter that returns an extension resource, and a user click. Keep those prerequisites attached to the headline.
The picker belongs to the extension even though its interface appears over a webpage. It can ask the extension to save filters. Van Bodegom says picker-created rules were treated as trusted, at least until recompilation, and some trusted filters can inject JavaScript into a matching page.
A filtering feature could supply a harmless replacement for a script the website expected. That resource path also exposed the extension's random internal address. Once a hostile page knew the address, it could load the picker and send it messages. An insufficiently checked input could carry another rule into the trusted store.
That authority crossed a site boundary: a rule created through one page could target another site and run script in that site's context. Our video illustrates the reported relationship. We have not run the exploit demonstration, changed an extension installation or tested anyone's accounts.
A click and an important evidence boundary
The reported path still needed a click. Van Bodegom describes hiding or covering the embedded picker so an ordinary page click hits its Create button. He explicitly says he did not implement that hidden-overlay portion. The verified picker-control path and the proposed concealment technique have different evidence behind them.
Recompilation could clear the rule's trusted status, according to the researcher. He also notes that the attacking page could immediately open the target page. A possible later cleanup leaves time for the earlier consequence. That is a poor place to put the security guarantee.
The report and advisory provide no victim count or evidence of active exploitation. The report mentions a similar, less problematic issue in uBlock Origin Lite separately. Its different version and architecture deserve their own assessment.
Why the first fix wasn't enough
Hill's November 2 hardening, released in 1.75.2, avoided potentially tainted request methods in the filtering scripts. The email exchange records a bypass that could still expose the internal identifier through another part of the request machinery. Protecting one route to the address left a powerful interface accepting the wrong caller.
The November 3 repair, released in 1.75.4, launched the picker only with a verified secret token. The legitimate extension flow supplies authorization, and the picker checks it. Knowing the interface's address alone should leave an untrusted webpage outside that boundary.
Later changes validated proposed filters and restricted resource-related filters. Those are additional protections. They do not change the selected advisory's statement that 1.75.4 is patched.
The human work behind the model-assisted report
Van Bodegom says GPT-5.6 Sol found the issue after he supplied a hypothesis about filter injection. He checked and verified the result; Claude wrote much of the demonstration code. Those are the author's statements about his workflow. They supply no independent benchmark of autonomous security research.
The report sent to the maintainer and the installable repairs are the useful receipts. I would keep the security lesson centered on who can command a privileged interface, rather than letting an AI leaderboard argument take over the story.
Verdict: SHIP IT
I'd ship the patched picker because it checks authorization at the control boundary, and I'd keep the current stable extension installed. Future security work stays open. A bouncer who checks the invitation can do his job even when everybody knows the venue.
Sources
Visual credits: original public-header recording and conceptual illustrations by The Daily Diff. The video quotes a short silent Nedry/Wayne Knight-like caricature from this GIPHY page, which links a timbenj/Photobucket source. Animation authorship and original film-native footage are unverified. Underlying source/film/character/likeness owners retain copyright; hosting grants no reuse licence or blanket permission. The article's displayed CC BY-SA4 licence applies to that article. Other assets and the episode retain their own rights boundaries.
And that's the diff for today. I'm Niko from Axrisi. Merge responsibly.

